Guanxi as one of the key factors leading to business success in China (PRC) has ironically been synonymous with bribery. This raises some serious questions: should Western foreign firms do business in China? How should they do business with Chinese firms? This study investigated the relationship between guanxi orientation and cognitive moral development in an attempt to determine whether the level of guanxi orientation of Chinese business people affects their ethical reasoning. Based on a classification of Chinese enterprises (Nee, 1992), (...) it was found that Chinese enterprises rely on guanxi for business to different extents. However, their levels of cognitive moral development are not significantly different, suggesting that guanxi orientation has very little to do with ethical reasoning (as captured through an established measure of cognitive moral development). Furthermore, time in profession was found to positively affect guanxi orientation; however, age failed to predict guanxi orientation and education turned out to be a negative predictor of guanxi orientation. (shrink)

This study uses three audit-specific ethical dilemmas to assess the level of ethical reasoning between Chinese accounting students (as proxies for new entrants to the auditing profession) and experienced auditors. A sample of U.S. accounting students is used as a base for comparison. Consistent with expectations based on particularly salient aspects of Chinese national culture, we find the Chinese students’ levels of ethical reasoning to be significantly lower than those of their U.S. counterparts in the two cases that invoked these (...) cultural attributes. In contrast, the Chinese students’ level of ethical reasoning is slightly higher than that of the U.S. students in the third, control case. We further find that the Chinese auditors’ levels of ethical reasoning are even lower than those of the Chinese students in two cases, while not being significantly different in the third. Together, these findings suggest that cross-national differences in auditors’ ethical reasoning depend on the nature of the ethical dilemma and caution against wholesale inferences about ethical reasoning levels in China. (shrink)

Guanxi (literally interpersonal connections) is in essence a network of resource coalition-based stakeholders sharing resources for survival, and it plays a key role in achieving business success in China. However, the salience of guanxi stakeholders varies: not all guanxi relationships are necessary, and among the necessary guanxi participants, not all are equally important. A hierarchical stakeholder model of guanxi is developed drawing upon Mitchell et al.’s (1997) stakeholder salience theory and Anderson’s (1982) constituency theory. As an application of instrumental stakeholder (...) theory, the model dimensionalizes the notion of stakeholder salience, and distinguishes between and among internal and external guanxi, core, major, and peripheral guanxi, and primary and secondary guanxi stakeholders. Guanxi management principles are developed based on a hierarchy of guanxi priorities and management specializations. The goal of this application of instrumental stakeholder theory is to construct, for Western business firms in China, a means to reliably identify guanxi partners by employing the principles of effective guanxi. These principles are described in the form of testable propositions that advance social scientific research in this area of international business ethics. (shrink)

We argue that consumer sovereignty in an increasingly high tech world is more of a fiction than a fact. We show how the principle of consumer sovereignty that governs the societal impact of economic competition is no longer valid. The world of high tech is increasingly responsible for changes in the opportunity, ability, and motivation of business firms to compete. Furthermore, the world of high tech is increasingly responsible for changes in the opportunity, ability, and motivation of consumers to engage (...) in rational decision making. We conclude that we cannot rely on consumer sovereignty to maintain a thriving economy. Instead, we need to develop performance standards designed to meet the demands of the various stakeholders of the organization. (shrink)

This article describes the mystery of a long lost codex of Archimedes that resurfaced briefly at the turn of the last century by Johan Ludwig Heiberg. Long enough for the Danish historian of mathematics Heiberg to identify, photograph and eventually transcribe “The Method” and several other works by Archimedes of considerable mathematical interest. In 1879 Heiberg completed his dissertation, Quaestiones Archimedeae, devoted to Archimedes’ life, works, and transmission of his texts.Este artículo describe el misterio de un códice de Arquímedes perdido (...) hace mucho tiempo que reapareció brevemente a principios del siglo pasado de la mano de Johan Ludwig Heiberg. Tiempo suficiente para que el historiador danés de las matemáticas Heiberg pudiese identificar, fotografiar y, finalmente, transcribir “El Método” y varias otras obras de Arquímedes de interés matemático considerable. En 1879 Heiberg completó su tesis doctoral, Quaestiones Archimedeae, dedicado a la vida de Arquímedes, las obras, y la transmisión de sus textos. (shrink)

Chow's defense of the null-hypothesis significance- test procedure is thoughtful and compelling in many respects. Nevertheless, techniques such as meta-analysis, power analysis, effect size estimation, and confidence intervals can be useful supplements to NHSTP in furthering the cumulative nature of behavioral research, as illustrated by the history of research on the spontaneous recovery of verbal learning.

The Pātañjalayogaśāstra is typically understood to define yoga as thought-suppression. In several publications, Ian Whicher has sought to avoid the conclusion that the PYŚ endorses thought-su...

Este artículo intenta contextualizar la interpretación de Agustín de Hipona de dos versos de la pasión Joánica, Juan 19:23-24, dentro del legado de la recepción bíblica norafricana y especialmente en diálogo con la posición donatista respecto a la naturaleza de la Iglesia, su relación con Cristo y su rol en el mundo presente. Las principales preguntas que serán examinadas acá serán: 1) ¿cómo la “túnica de Cristo” sirve como inspiración para la interpretación simbólica entre los autores latinos; y 2) ¿cómo (...) una lectura tan “tipológica” de Juan 19:23-24 —y su antecedente en el texto de los Salmos 21:19— tiene lugar en un campo más amplio como lo es el de la polémica antidonatista de Agustín? Presentando evidencia relevante, comienzo por discutir varias referencias de Agustín acerca de la tunica desuper texta cronológicamente, que se encuentran principalmente en el Tractatus in Iohannis Evangelium, al igual que en sus sermones. La perspectiva esencial de Agustín a la imagen de la túnica del Cristo nunca se aleja radicalmente de sus propias lecturas tempranas, aunque surgen más tarde algunas diferencias. En consecuencia, continúa la preocupación por el impacto del per totum en Juan 19:23 sobre el desarrollodel entendimiento de Agustín de la redención del Cristo, del regalo del Espíritu Santo y acerca de la extensión de la Iglesia por el mundo. A la luz de estos elementos, a pesar de que podamos comenzar a sospechar que Agustín promueve una forma de universalismo, su catolicidades una descripción mucho más justa y acertada de este esfuerzo por superar el exclusivismo donatista. Entre estos dos extremos, el catolicismo de Agustín puede ser detectado dentro del horizonte de este parde versos y de su relación con la Iglesia de África del Norte. (shrink)

On assiste ”a un « surplace » de la recherche philosophique en Occident. L’importance de l’histoire, le caract”ere d’ecisif de la culture, la dimension sociale de l’esprit, ne suscitent plus qu’un int’erêt ’episodique. On a oubli’e les apories de Kuhn. Am’ericains et Occidentaux sont des solipsiste s qui font mine d’ignorer la formation historique de l’esprit, renouvelant l’oubli de Kant et Husserl qui n’avaient pas su prendre en compte le caract”ere contingent, changeant, collectif, fortement historicis’e des comp’etences intellectuelles et cognitives. (...) S’epar’ee des pratiques consensuelles, la science perd son sens. Il faut revenir au probl”eme de l’individuation et reposer la question de l’acquisition de qualit’es uniques et pourtant g’en’erales qui font l’individualit’e. There is a general stagnation in western philosophical research. The importance of History, of Culture, the social nature of the Spirit, is of secondary interest, nowadays the meanest interest. What about the hard and sharp questions raised by Kuhn ? Americans or western nations are but solipsits, who get rid of the historical making of the spirit. To a certain extent, they keep on with Kant’s or Husserl’s tradition. None of them was in fact able to take care of historicism in the contingent and moving constitution of our intellectual capacities. In these conditions, no sense at all can be found in science. So, we must come back to the question of individuation and to these unique qualities of individuality, that is, at the same time, singularity and universality. (shrink)

RESUMEN En el libro X de la Metafísica se trazan las líneas generales de una henología. La reconstrucción de la argumentación debe hacerse desde dos pilares fundamentales: (a) la guía de problemas o aporías que proporciona el libro iii y (b) el proyecto ontológico anunciado en el libro iv, donde se señala la relación entre ontología y henología. El rasgo fundamental de dicha henología sería su subordinación a la ontología. El artículo argumenta que para Aristóteles el rol de la henología (...) es ante todo destructivo, pues con dicha doctrina se pretende establecer -ante todo- la imposibilidad de considerar al "uno" (τὸ ἓν) como principio de los entes. ABSTRACT In the Metaphysics, especially in Book X, are drawn the general lines of a henology. For the proper understanding of this doctrine it is necessary to reconstruct its argumentation from two fundamental basis: (a) the guide of puzzles or aporias that book iii provides and (b) the ontological project announced in book IV where the relationship between ontology and henology is indicated. Once the explanations of Book X are framed a theory about unity (τὸ ἓν) can be systematically assembled, whose fundamental feature would be the following: henology as a science is a subordinate part of ontology. The role of henology is for Aristotle primarily destructive, that is, with this doctrine it is intended to establish the impossibility of considering the 'one' (τὸ ἓν) as a principle of the entities. (shrink)

PHOTO ID 121339257© Designer491| Dreamstime.com ABSTRACT When physicians use their clinical knowledge and skills to advance the well-being of their patients, there may be apparent conflict between patient autonomy and physician beneficence. We are skeptical that today’s medical ethics education adequately fosters future physicians’ commitment to beneficence, which is both rationally defensible and fundamentally consistent with patient autonomy. We use an ethical dilemma that was presented to a group of third-year medical students to examine how ethics education might be causing (...) them to give undue deference to autonomy, thereby undermining their commitment to beneficence. INTRODUCTION The right of patients to choose which treatments they prefer is rooted in today’s social mores and taught as a principle of medical ethics as respect for autonomy. Yet, when physicians use their clinical knowledge and skills to advance the well-being of their patients, there may be a conflict between patient autonomy and physician beneficence. We are skeptical that today’s medical ethics education adequately fosters a commitment to beneficence, which is both rationally defensible and fundamentally consistent with patient autonomy. I. An Ethical Dilemma The impetus for this paper arose when students who were completing their third clinical year discussed a real-life ethical dilemma. A middle-aged man developed a pulmonary hemorrhage while on blood thinners for a recently placed coronary stent. The bleeding was felt to be reversible, but the patient needed immediate intubation or he would die. The cardiologist was told that the patient previously expressed to other physicians that he never wanted to be intubated. However, the cardiologist made the decision to intubate the patient anyway, and the patient eventually recovered.[1] Students were asked if they believed that the cardiologist had acted ethically. Their overwhelming response was, “No, the patient should have been allowed to die.” We looked into how students applied ethical reasoning to conclude that this outcome was ethically preferred. To explore how the third-year clinical experience might have formed the students’ judgment, we presented the same case to students who were just beginning their third year. Their responses were essentially uniform in recommending intubation. While there is likely more than one reasonable view in this case, we agree with the physician and the younger medical students that intubation was the ethically appropriate decision and will present an argument for it. But first, we explain the reasoning behind the more advanced medical students’ decision to choose patient autonomy at the expense of beneficence. II. Medical Ethics Education and the Priority of Autonomy Beauchamp and Childress’s Principles of Biomedical Ethics, first published in 1979 and now in its 8th edition, is a significant part of the formal ethics education in medical school.[2] Students learn an ethical decision-making approach based on respect for four ethical principles: autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. While Beauchamp and Childress officially afford no prima facie superiority to any principle, the importance of respect for patient autonomy has increased through the editions of their book. For example, early editions of their book opposed the legalization of physician-assisted death compared to recent editions that defended it.[3] As another example, Beauchamp and Childress make paternalism harder to justify by adding an autonomy-protecting condition to the list of conditions for acceptable paternalism.[4] Authority, they contend, need not conflict with autonomy—provided the authority is autonomously chosen.[5] “The main requirement,” they write, “is to respect a particular patient’s or subject’s autonomous choices, whatever they may be.[6] In the principlism of Beauchamp and Childress, autonomy now seems to have a kind of default priority.[7] However, the bioethics discourse has strong counternarratives, noting some movement to elevate the role of beneficence and to respect the input of stakeholders, including the family and the healthcare team. Ethics education achieves particular relevance in the third clinical year when students become embedded in the care of patients and learn from what has been called the informal curriculum. They observe how attending physicians approach day-to-day ethical problems at the patient’s bedside. In this context, students observe the importance of informed consent for serious treatments or invasive procedures, a practice that highlights the principle of patient autonomy. In both the formal and informal curriculum, medical students observe how, in the words of Paul Wolpe, “patient autonomy has become the central and most powerful principle in ethical decision-making in American medicine.”[8] In short, students appear to learn a deference for patient autonomy. This curricular shift in favor of autonomy coincides with legal developments that protect patients’ rights and decision-making with respect to their healthcare choices. The priority of autonomy in medicine benefits patients by reflecting their choices and, in some cases, their fundamental liberty. III. The Practice of Medicine and the Commitment to Beneficence There are many critiques of the dominant place that autonomy has in biomedical ethics,[9] especially considering that autonomy seems to be biased toward individualistic, Western, and somewhat American culture-driven values.[10] In addition, many bioethical dilemmas are cast as a conflict between autonomy and beneficence. Our point is that medical students bring to their study of medicine a commitment to beneficence that seems to be suppressed by practical ethics education. We think this commitment is rationally defensible and should be nurtured. It is striking that young medical students have a pre-reflective commitment to beneficence at all. For, as we mentioned, it is not just medicine but Western culture generally that prioritizes autonomy in settling ethical dilemmas. In wanting to act for the good of others (rather than simply agreeing to what others want), physicians are already swimming somewhat against the cultural tide.[11] However, doing so makes sense, given the nature of medicine and the profession of healing. When prospective medical students are asked why they wish to become physicians, the usual answer is some variation on caring for the sick and preventing disease. It is unlikely that a reason to become a physician is to respect a patient’s autonomy. It would be easy to dismiss medical students’ commitment to beneficence as a mere intuition and contrary to a more reasoned and deliberative approach. Beauchamp and Childress seem to minimize the value of physician intuition, stating that justifications for certain procedures are “…supported by good reasons. They need not rest merely in intuition or feeling.”[12] Henry Richardson writes that “situational or perceptive intuition…leaves the reasons for decision unarticulated.”[13] We think this is a crude and rather thin way of understanding intuition. Some bioethicists have defended intuition as essential to the practice of medicine and not something opposed to reason.[14] In the case we describe, we believe the ethical justifications s for the patient’s intubation are fundamentally sound: the patient did not have a “do not intubate” order written in the chart, the emergency intubation had not been foreseen, so the patient did not have the opportunity to consent to or reject intubation; the patient had consented to the treatment for his cardiac disease so his consent for intubation could have been assumed;[15] and the consequences of respecting his autonomy did not justify allowing him to die.[16] While it is possible to have more than one reasonable view on this case, we think the case for beneficence is strong and certainly should not be dismissed out of hand. We do not deny that if a patient makes a clearly documented, well-informed decision to forgo intubation that this decision ought to be respected by the physician (even if the physician disagrees with the patient’s decision). But, in this situation, as in many others in the practice of medicine, the patient’s real wishes and preferences are not well-articulated in advance. There are many cases where a physician acts based on what she believes the patient, or the surrogate, would want, sometimes in situations that do not allow much time for reflection. An example might be resuscitation of a newborn at the borderline of viability. In their ethics education, beneficence would mean acting first to save a life. If the patient or surrogate makes an informed decision to the contrary, a beneficent physician respects that autonomous decision. In the case presented, the patient expressed gratitude to the cardiologist when extubated. But what if he had expressed anger at the physician for violating his autonomy? There are those who could argue that not only was intubation ethically wrong but that the cardiologist put himself in legal jeopardy by his actions (especially if there had been a written refusal applicable to the specific situation). In the example we use, we point out that the cardiologist may not have escaped a lawsuit if the patient had died without intubation. His family, when hearing the circumstances, may have sued for failure to act and dereliction of the cardiologist’s duty to save him. Beyond a potential legal challenge for either action or inaction, there is an overriding ethical question the cardiologist had to address: what course would be most satisfying to his conscience? Would he rather allow a patient to die for fear of recrimination, or act to save his life, regardless of the personal consequences? In the absence of real knowledge about the patient’s considered wishes, it is most reasonable to err on the side of promoting patient well-being. A physician’s commitment to beneficence is not necessarily a way of undermining a patient’s autonomy. In acting for the patient's good, physicians are also acting on what it is reasonable to believe a patient (or most patients, perhaps) would want, which is obviously connected to what a patient does want. Pellegrino and Thomasma argue that beneficence includes respect for a patient’s autonomy since “the best interests of the patient are intimately linked with their preferences.”[17] Instead of conceptualizing ethical dilemmas in medicine as conflicts between autonomy and beneficence, it is possible that medical schools could teach students that truly practicing beneficence is a way of valuing patient autonomy, especially when the patient’s wishes are not specific to the situation and are not clearly expressed. CONCLUSION It is important for students and practicing physicians to understand the principle of respect for patient autonomy in a pluralistic society that demands personal self-determination. However, the role of the physician as a beneficent healer should not be diminished by this respect for autonomy. Respecting a patient’s autonomy is grounded in and manifested by physician beneficence.[18] That is, seeking what is good for the patient can only be good if it respects their personhood and dignity. We propose that a commitment to beneficence, incipient in young medical students, should be developed over time with their other clinical reasoning skills. Such a commitment need not be sacrificed on the altar of patient autonomy. Beneficence needs greater relative moral weight with students as they proceed in their ethics education. - [1] S. Jauhar, “When Doctors Need to Lie,” New York Times, February 22, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/23/opinion/sunday/when-doctors-need-to-lie.html. [2] T. L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 8th ed. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019). [3] Louise A. Mitchell, “Major Changes in Principles of Biomedical Ethics,” The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 14, no. 3 (2014): 459–75, https://doi.org/10.5840/ncbq20141438. [4] Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 8th ed. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019), 238. [5] Beauchamp and Childress, 103. [6] Beauchamp and Childress, p. 108. [7] For other accounts that prioritize autonomy, see e.g. Allen E. Buchanan and Dan W. Brock, Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making (Cambridge University Press, 1989), 38–39; R Gillon, “Ethics Needs Principles—Four Can Encompass the Rest—and Respect for Autonomy Should Be ‘First among Equals,’” Journal of Medical Ethics 29, no. 5 (October 2003): 307–12, https://doi.org/10.1136/jme.29.5.307. For examples of critiques of these accounts, see footnote 9. [8] P. R. Wolpe, “The Triumph of Autonomy in American Bioethics: A Sociological View,” in Bioethics and Society: Constructing the Ethical Enterprise, p. 43. [9] V. A. Entwistle et al., “Supporting Patient Autonomy: The Importance of Clinician-Patient Relationships,” Journal of General Internal Medicine 25, no. 7 (July 2010): 741–45; C. Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death: The Tyranny of Autonomy in Medical Ethics and Law, 1st ed. (Oxford ; Hart Publishing, 2009); O. O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics, The Gifford Lectures, University of Edinburgh 2001 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002). [10] P. Marshall and B. Koenig, “Accounting for Culture in a Globalized Bioethics,” The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics: A Journal of the American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics 32, no. 2 (2004): 252–66; R. Fan, “Self-Determination vs. Family-Determination: Two Incommensurable Principles of Autonomy,” Bioethics 11, no. 3–4 (1997): 309–22. [11] Arguments stressing the importance of beneficence, as ours does here, certainly approach paternalistic arguments. We set aside the complex issue of paternalism for purposes of this paper and simply note that the principle of beneficence as such does not say anything specifically about acting against the patient’s will. In the case study that focuses this paper, we do not believe the patient’s will or wishes were clearly indicated. [12] Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, p. 20, see note 2 above. [13] H. S. Richardson, “Specifying, Balancing, and Interpreting Bioethical Principles,” The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine 25, no. 3 (January 1, 2000): 285–307, p. 287. [14] H. D. Braude, Intuition in Medicine a Philosophical Defense of Clinical Reasoning (Chicago ; University of Chicago Press, 2012). [15] R. Kukla, “Conscientious Autonomy: Displacing Decisions in Health Care,” The Hastings Center Report 35, no. 2 (2005): 34–44. [16] M. Schermer, The Different Faces of Autonomy: Patient Autonomy in Ethical Theory and Hospital Practice, vol. 13, Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2002). [17] E. D. Pellegrino and D. C. Thomasma, For the Patient’s Good - the Restoration of Beneficence in Health Care (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 29. [18] Pellegrino and Thomasma, For the Patient’s Good. 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RESUMEN Los estudios actuales sobre la mentira priman su lado epistémico y desatienden los aspectos morales. Tal distinción es clara en los intentos de diferenciar la mentira de la intención de engañar, y tienen como contrapartida una concepción de la verdad realista. Por ello, las interpretaciones que cuestionan o minimizan la existencia de la Verdad tienden a ser rechazadas, y parece que tampoco podrían abordar satisfactoriamente la mentira. En este artículo cuestionaremos dicha asunción, mostrando cómo un autor del Renacimiento, Michel (...) de Montaigne, sostiene una perspectiva "negadora" de la verdad y critica la mentira, precisamente destacando su dimensión moral. ABSTRACT Current studies on lying emphasize its epistemic side and neglect the moral aspects. Such a distinction is clear in the attempts to distinguish lying from the intention to deceive and has as a counterpart a realistic conception of truth. Therefore, interpretations that question the existence of truth, or that minimize it, tend to be rejected, and it seems that they could not satisfactorily address the lie either. In this article we will question this assumption, showing how a Renaissance author, Michel de Montaigne, maintains a "denying" perspective of truth while criticizing the lie, precisely by highlighting its moral dimension. (shrink)

Muchas personas pobres y oprimidas dejan sus paísesen el tercer mundo para veniralas ricas sociedades occidentales. Este artículo sostiene que hay pocas justificaciones para mantenerlos fuera. Su inspiración abreva de tres aproximaciones contemporáneas a la teoría política-la de Rawls, la de Nozick y el utilitarismo para construir argumentos a favor de la apertura de fronteras. El hecho de que, a pesar de sus significativos desacuerdos en otros temas, en esta materia las tres teorías converjan en las mismas conclusiones, fortalece el (...) argumento a favor de la apertura de fronteras y revela su fundamentación en nuestro compromiso en respetar a todos los seres humanos como personas morales libres e iguales. La parte final del ensayo considera los argumentos comunitaristas que objetan la anterior conclusión, en especial los formulados por Michael Walzer. (shrink)

Harold Laski (Manchester, 1893-Londres, 1950) es de los pocos teóricos del Estado en el mundo anglo-sajón que, desde John Stuart Mill, merece ser recordado. Sus teorías se desenvuelven en el tránsito del pensamiento liberal a la acción de tipo socialista. Fue miembro de la renombrada Fabian Society aunque renunció a su puesto en el Comité Ejecutivo Fabiano aduciendo incompatibilidad de opiniones, pues no aceptaba la posición "gradualista" y evolucionista de la socialdemocracia. Además formó parte del comité ejecutivo del partido laboralista (...) -aunque con serias disensiones con el premier MacDonald-, que debería estudiar los cambios originados en la acción socialista tras la primera Guerra Mundial. A su renombre puede haber ayudado el hecho de haber enseñado en las prestigiosas universidades de Mac-Gill de Montreal y en Harvard. De todas formas, a pesar de ser un pensador que extrajo sus teorías de la práctica y dar a sus aportaciones un contenido pragmático, como Hobbes o Locke, no se puede parangonar en ningún caso con ellos. Se trata -a pesar de sus bandazos- de un intelectual independiente de izquierda, postura que afirmó en su pertenencia al partido laborista. De esta suerte su teoría política pudo fundarse en la ética, que como se verá no se deja entremezclar con el materialismo histórico marxista. El Estado en la teoría y en la práctica corresponde al período en el que busca un acomodamiento de la teoría del Estado a las nuevas circunstancias, una fase que el autor inicia en la década de los treinta del siglo XX. Es un libro que desarrolla y amplía, como él deja claro, su libro anterior, La Democracia en crisis (1933), que también fuera traducido para Revista de Derecho Privado, y supone un perfeccionamiento de sus principios filosóficos. Laski se ocupa de diagnosticar las causas del fracaso y avanza un proyecto de teoría social que se propone desenvolver en el marco de ocho años. Este plan sería corregido después de colaboraciones en simposios y de publicaciones en diversas revistas junto a un grupo de adalides del socialismo, entre los que cabe destacar a Bernard Shaw, J.A. Hobson o Lowes Dickinson entre otros. Este libro, que se vertió al castellano en 1936, fue traducido por Vicente Herrero Ayllón. INDICE. Presentación Prefacio Capítulo I.- La concepción filosófica del Estado Capítulo II.- Estado y Gobierno en el mundo real Capítulo III.- El Estado y la comunidad internacional Capítulo IV.- Perspectivas para nuestra generación. (shrink)

The I Ching, or Book of Changes, has been one of the two or three most influential books in the Chinese canon. It has been used by people on all levels of society, both as a method of divination and as a source of essential ideas about the nature of heaven, earth, and humankind. During the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Sung dynasty literati turned to it for guidance in their fundamental reworking of the classical traditions. This book explores how four (...) leading thinkers — Su Shih, Shao Yung, Ch’eng I, and Chu Hsi — applied the I Ching to these projects. These four men used the Book of Changes in strikingly different ways. Yet each claimed to find in it a sure foundation for human values. Their work established not only new meanings for the text but also new models for governance and moral philosophy that would be debated throughout the next thousand years of Chinese intellectual history. By focusing on their uses of the I Ching, this study casts a unique light on the complex continuity-within-change and rich diversity of Sung culture. (shrink)

El presente artículo discute sobre la inclusión del contrarrevolucionario Joseph de Maistre en la problemática categoría de reaccionario político, pero sostiene que se trata de un conservador. Para llevar a cabo este objetivo, se hace un análisis de tipo teórico de acuerdo con las exigencias de la hermenéutica textual y considerando los aportes de la historia de las ideas y de la historia conceptual. Con esto en mente, en la primera parte de este trabajo se detectan los problemas del (...) uso del concepto de reacción para la teoría política y se demuestra su injustificada aplicación al pensamiento de De Maistre. En la segunda parte, se despliega el concepto de conservadurismo sustantivo para definir la corriente conservadora con vistas a, en la tercera parte, reconsiderar su obra a partir del marco conceptual presentado. Se concluye la conveniencia heurística de la categoría propuesta para la comprensión del autor saboyano. (shrink)

El artículo se constituye en una exploración del pensamiento de un escritor, pensador y activista afrocostarricense Dolores Joseph Montout, específicamente en relación con el Caribe. La reconstrucción de sus ideas se basó principalmente en su obra periodística en los años treinta, en The Searchlight y The Atlantic Voice, en los cuales escribió asiduamente sobre sus principales preocupaciones referentes a la población afrocostarricense. Se recuperan tres aspectos fundamentales en su obra: a) sus inquietudes nacionalistas y su lucha por la integración (...) y ciudadanía de los afrodescendientes, b) su relación y controversias con las ideas de Marcus Garvey y la Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) y los ataques producto de su posición y c) la importancia que le brinda a la educación y a la formación intelectual de los jóvenes para el crecimiento de su cultura, por ejemplo, a través delClub Literario Alpha. En las conclusiones, se evidencia lo contradictorio y lo complejo de su pensamiento y de la diversidad y diferencias de la población afrocostarricense entre 1930-1938, sus ideas nacionalistas y patrióticas, así como la importancia de proseguir con este tipo de estudios, tanto del autor como de otros pensadores y pensadoras invisibilizados enla historia del Caribe costarricense. (shrink)

En este artículo se analiza el modo en que Joseph Ratzinger se enfrentó en su tesis de habilitación al rechazo de la filosofía por parte de Buenaventura, uno de sus teólogos favoritos. El esfuerzo que hace Ratzinger por reconciliar al doctor Seráfico con el pensamiento filosófico arroja valiosas luces para iluminar el problema de la relación entre la fe y la razón en general, y la teología y la filosofía en particular. El enemigo de Buenaventura no es a fin (...) de cuentas la filosofía, sino un modo desordenado de entenderla con una pretensión de autonomía, desconectada de las fuentes de la revelación.En este artículo se analiza el modo en que Joseph Ratzinger se enfrentó en su tesis de habilitación al rechazo de la filosofía por parte de Buenaventura, uno de sus teólogos favoritos. El esfuerzo que hace Ratzinger por reconciliar al doctor Seráfico con el pensamiento filosófico arroja valiosas luces para iluminar el problema de la relación entre la fe y la razón en general, y la teología y la filosofía en particular. El enemigo de Buenaventura no es a fin de cuentas la filosofía, sino un modo desordenado de entenderla con una pretensión de autonomía, desconectada de las fuentes de la revelación. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es reflexionar, a partir de algunos textos clave de Joseph Ratzinger, acerca de la relación que el cristianismo siempre ha tenido con la filosofía y con el tipo de racionalidad que se desarrolló en Occidente. El cristianismo nunca se ha asumido como una propuesta religiosa más, sino como "la verdad revelada". Desde sus orígenes ha tenido que convivir con múltiples ofertas religiosas y hoy en día no puede sustraerse a ello en un contexto marcado (...) por el pluralismo, como el de nuestra época. Esta condición le impele actualmente a reivindicar su carácter racional inherente y afrontar los desafíos que cierto irracionalismo de la cultura posmoderna le pone frente a sí. (shrink)

Theories of discourse bring to realism new ideas about how knowledge develops and how representations of reality are influenced. We gain an understanding of the conceptual aspect of social life and the processes by which meaning is produced. This collection reflects the growing interest realist critics have shown towards forms of discourse theory and deconstruction. The diverse range of contributions address such issues as the work of Derrida and deconstruction, discourse theory, Eurocentrism and poststructuralism. What unites all of the contributions (...) is a sense that it is essential to provide a realist alternative to the hitherto dominance of social constructionism, hermeneutics and postmodernism, over many of the issues discussed. By developing a realist perspective the different authors attempt to embed discourse within the structured nature of the reality of the world. Realism can situate language, discourse and ideology within context specific, or 'causally efficacious' circumstances. Realism can help to uncover issues of power, representation, and subjectivity and how discursive and other social practices produce real effects. This can help us understand the manner in which social structures are reproduced through various forms of ideology and discourse. And by knowing this, we can start to address questions concerning human emancipation and how the world is to be transformed. (shrink)

The frame problem was originally a problem for Artificial Intelligence, but philosophers have interpreted it as an epistemological problem for human cognition. As a result of this reinterpretation, however, specifying the frame problem has become a difficult task. To get a better idea of what the frame problem is, how it gives rise to more general problems of relevance, and how deep these problems run, I expound six guises of the frame problem. I then assess some proposed heuristic solutions to (...) the frame problem; I show that these proposals misunderstand, and fail to address, an important aspect of the frame problem. Finally, I argue that though human cognition does not solve the frame problem in its epistemological guise, human cognition avoids some of the epistemological worries. (shrink)

Topics covered in Discrete Mathematics have become essential tools in many areas of studies in recent years. This is primarily due to the revolution in technology, communications, and cyber security. The book treats major themes in a typical introductory modern Discrete Mathematics course: Propositional and predicate logic, proof techniques, set theory (including Boolean algebra, functions and relations), introduction to number theory, combinatorics and graph theory. An accessible, precise, and comprehensive approach is adopted in the treatment of each topic. The ability (...) of abstract thinking and the art of writing valid arguments are emphasized through detailed proof of (almost) every result. Developing the ability to think abstractly and roguishly is key in any areas of science, information technology and engineering. Every result presented in the book is followed by examples and applications to consolidate its comprehension. The hope is that the reader ends up developing both the abstract reasoning as well as acquiring practical skills. All efforts are made to write the book at a level accessible to first-year students and to present each topic in a way that facilitates self-directed learning. Each chapter starts with basic concepts of the subject at hand and progresses gradually to cover more ground on the subject. Chapters are divided into sections and subsections to facilitate readings. Each section ends with its own carefully chosen set of practice exercises to reenforce comprehension and to challenge and stimulate readers. As an introduction to Discrete Mathematics, the book is written with the smallest set of prerequisites possible. Familiarity with basic mathematical concepts (usually acquired in high school) is sufficient for most chapters. However, some mathematical maturity comes in handy to grasp some harder concepts presented in the book. (shrink)

El artículo busca, a través de una exposición general de su obra de filosofíamoral, presentar la concepción de la conciencia moral desarrollada por JosephButler. Se busca así presentar el pensamiento de este autor a la comunidadfilosófica hispanoparlante, y responder a algunas críticas que ha recibido departe de filósofos como Elizabeth Anscombe.

La reflexión teológica sobre la Iglesia es transversal en la obra ratzingeriana. En ella, la Iglesia destaca por su entidad teologal específica y la proporción universal de comunión que presenta a partir del cuerpo único de Cristo. La forma nosotros, con la que Joseph Ratzinger se refiere a la Iglesia, expresa justamente esta unidad de integración de la humanidad en Cristo, a partir de su cuerpo, que no se corresponde con la mera suma de sus miembros, sino realidad absolutamente (...) nueva: el uno comunional antropo-teológico (Iglesia), sujeto propio en la historia. (shrink)

国家重点学科“985第1期”建设项目 “211工程第2期”项目广东省2004哲学社会科学规划项目中山大学马克思主义哲学与中国现代化研究所主持研究.

Ranging over central issues of morals and politics and the nature of freedom and authority, this study examines the role of value-neutrality, rights, equality, ...

Social science researchers often definefilial pietyas a set of norms, values, and practices regarding how children should behave toward their parents. In this article, we trace the conceptual development of filial piety research in Chinese and other societies to highlight the assumptions underlying this traditional approach to filial piety research. We identify the limitations of these assumptions, including the problem of an evolving definition and lack of cross-cultural applicability. We then advocate an alternative framework that overcomes these limitations by focusing (...) on the deep structure of filial piety: the dual filial piety model (DFPM). The DFPM applies the concept of contextualized personality to reconceptualize filial piety in terms of authoritarian and reciprocal psychological motivations particular to the parent-child context. Because the focus is on a universal psychological mechanism rather than cultural norms, values, and behavior, the DFPM may be applied for investigation of filial piety at individual, social, and cultural levels within and across various societies. We discuss application of the DFPM in relation to existing filial piety and intergenerational relations research from several societies and conclude with a comparison to other recent proposals for measuring Chinese filial piety. (shrink)

El artículo se constituye en una exploración del pensamiento de un escritor, pensador y activista afrocostarricense Dolores Joseph Montout, específicamente en relación con el Caribe. La reconstrucción de sus ideas se basó principalmente en su obra periodística en los años treinta, en The Searchlight y The AtlanticVoice, en los cuales escribió asiduamente sobre sus principales preocupaciones referentes a la población afrocostarricense. Se recuperan tres aspectos fundamentales en su obra: a) sus inquietudes nacionalistas y su lucha por la integración y (...) ciudadanía de los afrodescendientes, b) su relación y controversias con las ideas de Marcus Garvey y la Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) y los ataques producto de su posición y c) la importancia que le brinda a la educación y a la formación intelectual de los jóvenes para el crecimiento de su cultura, por ejemplo, a través del Club Literario Alpha. En las conclusiones, se evidencia lo contradictorio y lo complejo de su pensamiento y de la diversidad y diferencias de la población afrocostarricense entre 1930-1938, sus ideas nacionalistas y patrióticas, así como la importancia de proseguir con este tipo de estudios, tanto del autor como de otros pensadores y pensadoras invisibilizados en la historia del Caribe costarricense. (shrink)

Recorrido breve por su obra, con motivo de su reciente fallecimiento.

In the field of psychology, filial piety is usually defined in terms of traditional Chinese culture-specific family traditions. The problem with this approach is that it tends to emphasize identification of behavioral rules or norms, which limits its potential for application in other cultural contexts. Due to the global trend of population aging, governments are searching for solutions to the accompanying financial burden so greater attention is being focused on the issue of elder care and its relevance to filial practices. (...) We contend that the psychological investigation of filial piety in Chinese societies has progressed to the point that it can now provide a solid structure for research targeting intergenerational relations in other cultures. We describe an indigenous psychology approach that integrated Chinese historical, philosophical, and social trends to construct a model of filial piety in terms of the dual reciprocal and authoritarian filial aspects underlying parent-child relations: the dual filial piety model (DFPM). We use this model to re-conceptualize filial piety from its usual definition as a set of Chinese culture-specific norms to a contextualized personality construct represented by a pair of culturally-sensitive psychological schemas of parent-child interaction. We then describe how the DFPM can provide a framework for research on filial relations on individual, structural, societal, and cross-cultural levels. We conclude with a discussion of how the model may be able to integrate and extend Western research on intergenerational relations and contribute to the issue of elder care beyond Chinese societies. (shrink)

Il saggio si propone di spiegare una ironia del destino dell’opera di Joseph de Maistre: l’interesse di Isaiah Berlin e ricostruisce questo interesse rispetto alle sue occasioni e alle sue ragioni. Rispetto alle occasioni, intende rintracciare nella sfilacciata opera di saggista di Berlin la presenza di Maistre e ricostruirne l’interpretazione complessiva; rispetto alle sue ragioni mette invece a fuoco l’interesse nei confronti del rapporto tra contro-illuminismo e totalitarismo. Infatti, è questo nesso che rende chiaro il ruolo di profeta ultramoderno (...) che viene paradossalmente affidato al controrivoluzionario dagli interpreti novecenteschi. L’antropologia e la visione della storia del conte de Maistre illuminano il fenomeno del totalitarismo: Carl Schmitt lo invoca e ne incorpora la dottrina nella sua definizione della sovranità e Isaiah Berlin lo convoca per spiegare la passione umana per l’auto-sacrificio su cui (non solo) i totalitarismi si reggono. Eppure, la storia dell’ultimo secolo impedisce agli interpreti novecenteschi di comprendere fino in fondo la teologia politica di Maistre, di cui non rendono abbastanza conto le categorie di decisionismo (Schmitt) e irrazionalismo (Berlin). (shrink)

The recent emergence of generative AI software as viable tools for use in the cultural and creative industries has sparked debates about the potential for “creativity” to be automated and “augmented” by algorithmic machines. Such discussions, however, begin from an ontological position, attempting to define creativity by either falling prey to universalism (i.e. “creativity is X”) or reductionism (i.e. “only humans can be truly creative” or “human creativity will be fully replaced by creative machines”). Furthermore, such an approach evades addressing (...) the real and material impacts of AI on creative labour in these industries. This article thus offers more expansive methodological and conceptual approaches to the recent hype on generative AI. By combining (Csikszentmihalyi, The systems model of creativity, Springer, Dordrecht, 2014) systems view of creativity, in which we emphasise the shift from “what” to “where” is creativity, with (Lievrouw, Media technologies, The MIT Press, 2014) relational-materialist theory of “mediation”, we argue that the study of “creativity” in the context of generative AI must be attentive to the interactions between technologies, practices, and social arrangements. When exploring the relational space between these elements, three core concepts become pertinent: creative labour, automation, and distributed agency. Critiquing “creativity” through these conceptual lenses allows us to re-situate the use of generative AI within discourses of labour in post-industrial capitalism and brings us to a conceptualisation of creativity that privileges neither the human user nor machine algorithm but instead emphasises a relational and distributed form of agency. (shrink)

Jennifer Hornsby has defended the Reasons-Knowledge Thesis : the claim that \-ing because p requires knowing that p, where the ‘because’ at issue is a rationalising ‘because’. She defends by appeal to the thought that it provides the best explanation of why the subject in a certain sort of Gettier case fails to be in a position to \ because p. Dustin Locke and, separately, Nick Hughes, present some modified barn-façade cases which seem to constitute counterexamples to and undermine Hornsby’s (...) way of motivating it by rendering their alternative Reasons-Explanation Thesis a better explanation of Hornsby’s datum. This paper defends and Hornsby’s argument for it against those objections. First, I point out that their supposedly intuitive verdict about the relevant barn-façade cases is not as intuitive as they think. Second, I point out that even if we share the intuition: we have strong reason to doubt the verdict anyway. And finally, I point out that since is independently implausible, the two problems can be tackled anyway. (shrink)

According to standard comparativist views, death is bad insofar as it deprives someone of goods she would otherwise have had. In The Ethics of Killing, Jeff McMahan argues against such views and in favor of a gradualist account according to which how bad it is to die is a function of both the future goods of which the decedent is deprived and her cognitive development when she dies. Comparativists and gradualists therefore disagree about how bad it is to die at (...) different ages. In this paper I examine two prominent criticisms of gradualism and show that both misconstrue McMahan. I develop a related criticism that seems to show that a gradualist cannot coherently relate morbidity and mortality. This criticism also fails, but has an instructive implication for how policy-makers setting priorities for health care investments should regard choices between life-saving interventions and interventions against non-fatal diseases in the very young. (shrink)

Over the last few decades, multiple studies have examined the understanding of participants in clinical research. They show variable and often poor understanding of key elements of disclosure, such as expected risks and the experimental nature of treatments. Did the participants in these studies give valid consent? According to the standard view of informed consent they did not. The standard view holds that the recipient of consent has a duty to disclose certain information to the profferer of consent because valid (...) consent requires that information to be understood. The contents of the understanding and disclosure requirements are therefore conceptually linked. In this paper, we argue that the standard view is mistaken. The disclosure and understanding requirements have distinct grounds tied to two different ways in which a token of consent can be rendered invalid. Analysis of these grounds allows us to derive the contents of the two requirements. It also implies that it is sometimes permissible to enroll willing participants who have not understood everything that they ought to be told about their clinical trials. (shrink)